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PROPERTY LAW
PAMELA B. MINZNER*

I. INTRODUCTION

This section of the Survey reviews legislation and judicial decisions
in areas of New Mexico property law other than decedents' estates and
trusts, water law, and land use planning, each of which is treated elsewhere.' New Mexico appellate courts considered over thirty cases in areas
traditionally covered by the property Survey: landlord-tenant, contracts
and financing, deeds and titles, and actions and proceedings. In addition,
the Legislature enacted statutes in each of these areas. This section of
the Survey groups case law and legislation together within each area.
The period surveyed included significant developments, such as clarification of the rules governing restraints on alienation. Several cases
discussed exceptions to the common law rule prohibiting direct restraints
on alienation, 2 and both Congress and the New Mexico Legislature addressed the enforceability of "due-on-sale" clauses. 3 The New Mexico
Legislature also reformed the major barrier to indirect restraints on alienation, the common law Rule Against Perpetuities.4 In addition, many
cases arose under important statutory schemes. These cases analyzed
community property management requirements,' the right to partition, 6
and statutory foreclosure. 7

*Professor of Law, University of New Mexico School of Law; recently appointed Judge, New
Mexico Court of Appeals. The author acknowledges with appreciation the valuable research assistance
of Mary S. Howells, University of New Mexico School of Law, J.D. 1984, and of Timothy Hale,
University of New Mexico School of Law, J.D. 1985, the cheerful, competent assistance of Dale
Berlin and Cynthia M. Custer, University of New Mexico School of Law staff, and the exceptional
editing skills of Andrew G. Schultz, J.D. 1984.
1. See Laflin and Eisenberg, Estates and Trusts, supra at 153; Myers, Land Use Planning/Zoning,
supra at 183. The survey of water law scheduled for this issue will appear in a later issue.
2. See, e.g., Brummund v. First Nat'l Bank, 99 N.M. 221, 656 P.2d 884 (1983), discussed infra
at notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
3. See Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-320, § 341, 1982
U.S. Code & Ad. News (96 Stat.) 1469, 1505 and 1983 N.M. Laws ch. 314 (codified at N.M.
Stat. Ann. §§ 48-7-1 to 48-7-24 (Cum. Supp. 1983)), which are discussed infra at notes 33-53 and
accompanying text.
4. See 1983 N.M. Laws ch. 246 (codified at N.M. Stat. Ann. § 47-1-17.1 (Cum. Supp. 1983)),
discussed infra at notes 95-120 and accompanying text.
5. See, e.g., Dotson v. Grice, 98 N.M. 207, 647 P.2d 409 (1982) and Jeffers v. Doel, 99 N.M.
351, 658 P.2d 426 (1982), discussed infra at notes 72-84 and accompanying text.
6. See Martinez v. Martinez, 98 N.M. 535, 650 P.2d 819 (1982) and Pino v. Sanchez, 98 N.M.
150, 646 P.2d 577 (1982), discussed infra at notes 123-27 and accompanying text.
7. See, e.g., Federal Land Bank v. Burgett, 97 N.M. 519, 641 P.2d 1066 (1982).
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II. LANDLORD-TENANT AND RELATED RELATIONSHIPS

The relationship of landlord and tenant in American law has become
more contractual as courts and legislatures have imposed upon landlords
obligations more familiar to contract law, such as implied warranties.'
In the last Survey period, for example, the New Mexico Supreme Court
reasoned that general contract principles of good faith and commercial
reasonableness governed the construction of a lease clause.9 In this Survey
period, however, property law principles dominated the New Mexico
appellate court decisions and legislation.
Case developments in this area fall into two broad categories. First,
in several cases courts struggled to determine whether novel relationships
represented leases. Cases in this category represent unusual fact patterns
of limited precedential value for landlord-tenant law. " Second, in a num8. See generally, R. Schoshinski, American Law of Landlord and Tenant (1980), which a commentator has described as "the first general treatise on this subject in this country in twenty-five
years." Chase, The Property-ContractTheme in Landlord and Tenant Law: A CriticalCommentary
on Schoshinski's American Law of Landlord and Tenant, 13 Rutgers L.J. 189 (1982). Professor
Chase criticizes Professor Schoshinski and the current scholarship on the relationship between contract
and property law principles in landlord-tenant cases. He summarizes the literature and identifies an
"old school," which recognizes significant differences between contract and property law approaches
to landlord-tenant disputes, and a "new school," which considers the differences to be far less
important. Id. at 190 n. 4.
9. Boss Barbara, Inc. v. Newbill, 97 N.M. 239, 638 P.2d 1084 (1982).
10. Boothe Fin. Corp. v. Loretto Block, Inc., 97 N.M. 496, 641 P.2d 527 (Ct. App. 1982),
Hueschen v. Stalie, 98 N.M. 696, 652 P.2d 246 (1982), and Maynard v. Western Bank, 99 N.M.
135, 654 P.2d 1035 (1982). In Hueschen, the most important case of this group, the New Mexico
Supreme Court refused to find as a matter of law that an arrangement which was in form a lease
with an option to buy in substance represented a sale. In so holding, the New Mexico Supreme
Court reversed the court of appeals. See Dantoni v. Stalie, 21 N.M. St. B. Bull. 691 (June 3, 1982),
for the court of appeals' decision.
The court of appeals in Dantoni noted that a lease is a conveyance of real property for a limited
period of time and subject to conditions. The court then described the Stalies' rights to the land if
the option lapsed as a reversionary interest because the land would revert back to the Stalies in 1988
if the option was not exercised and the real estate contract would not end until 1999. The Stalies
had not made an assignment in violation of their contract with the Dantonis which, as a matter of
law, justified granting the latter's motion for summary judgment because the Stalies had a reversionary
interest.
The opinions of the New Mexico Supreme Court and the court of appeals deal with different kinds
of reversionary interests and seem to be deciding different issues. The court of appeals distinguished
types of transfers available to a lessee in determining whether a prohibited assignment had occurred.
Although courts have distinguished "assignments" from "subleases," more typically the distinction
decides the new tenant's liability on provisions in the original lease rather than the subsequent
transfer's validity. See J. Cribbet, Principles of Property 220-22 (2d ed. 1975). Jurisdictions have
varied in defining the kind of reversionary interest that distinguishes the "sublease" from an "assignment." Id. at 219-220.
The supreme court, on the other hand, distinguished transfers by the vendee forbidden under a
standard real estate contract unless the vendor consents. The court excluded leases because the vendee
reserves a reversionary interest. Perhaps the court simply defined the restraint on alienation narrowly.
In similar fashion, courts have construed prohibitions against leasing without consent not to include
subleasing without consent. Id. at 223.
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ber of cases the courts analyzed the respective rights, duties, and liabilities
of landlord and tenant. These cases tended to clarify the tenant's position.
In Speartex Grain Co. v. West, " for example, the court of appeals
construed the New Mexico "betterment" or "occupying claimant" statute 2
to require color of title, thereby preventing lessees from asserting liens
under the statute. In Speartex, the plaintiffs, who had improved and
repaired the property as lessees, sued to foreclose a lien for the value of
their efforts, relying on the "betterment" statute. The trial court granted
the defendants summary judgment, and the court of appeals affirmed.
The court of appeals observed that §42-4-17"3 established the right
which the plaintiffs were pursuing, and that §42-4-1814 described the
correlative duty. In Sandoval v. Perez,' 5 the supreme court construed § 424-17 to require color of title. Relying on this decision, the court in
Speartex concluded that both sections require color of title. Common law
rules governing fixtures support the Speartex result. 6
In El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Kysar Insurance Agency,' 7 El Paso
became the landlord by exercising an option to purchase and subsequently
suing for specific performance. '8 Thereafter, El Paso notified Kysar that
it must pay more rent because the prior rent reflected an arrangement
with El Paso's vendor that El Paso did not intend to continue. When
II.
12.
Study,
13.

98 N.M. 91, 645 P.2d 447 (Ct. App. 1982).
N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 42-4-14 to -19 (1978). See Casad, The Mistaken Improver-A Comparative
19 Hastings L.J. 1039 (1968), for a valuable historical analysis of such statutes.
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 42-4-17 provides:
When any person . . . may have heretofore made, or may hereafter make any
valuable improvements on any lands, and he ... [has] been or may hereafter be
deprived of the possession of said improvements in any manner whatever, he shall
have the right . . . to have the value of his said improvements assessed in his
favor ... and the said value so assessed shall be a lien upon the said land and
improvements, and all other lands of the person who so deprived him of the
possession thereof situate in the same county, until paid ...
14. N.M. Stat. Ann. §42-4-18 provides:
When any person claiming possession may have made, or may hereafter make,
any valuable improvements on any land in this state, and any other person shall
have taken, or may hereafter, in any manner, take from him ... the possession
of such improvements . . . the person so taking possession shall be liable for the
full value of such improvements so taken possession of. . . and the value of said
improvements shall be a lien upon the said improvements and the land in which
they are situate until paid; as also upon all other real estate of the person so taking
possession thereof situate in the same county.
15. 26 N.M. 280, 191 P. 467 (1920).
16. Unless the lease provided otherwise, at common law permanent improvements belonged to
the landlord when the lease terminated. The maxim quicquidplantatursolo, solo credit ("that which
is affixed to the soil belongs to the owner of the soil") applied. See generally Cribbet, supra note
10, at 234. See also Brown on Personal Property § 16.13 (3rd ed. 1975).
17. 98 N.M. 86, 645 P.2d 442 (1982).
18. See El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Kysar Ins. Agency, 93 N.M. 732, 605 P.2d 240 (Ct. App.
1979) for the prior litigation which established El Paso's title.
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Kysar refused, El Paso sent three demand letters, a monthly computerized
statement, and filed suit alleging fraud and breach of contract. In an
imaginative and very nearly successful tactic, Kysar counterclaimed for
damages of $21,938 for constructive eviction plus costs. Kysar remained
in possession until it successfully negotiated a sublease. The trial court
dismissed El Paso's complaint and granted Kysar's counterclaim. El Paso
9
appealed. The court of appeals affirmed in relevant part,' but the New
Mexico Supreme Court reversed.
The supreme court reaffirmed the principle that a landlord may incur
liability to his or her tenant for various types of eviction. The covenant
for quiet enjoyment imposes upon a landlord a duty to deliver possession
2
and to respect the tenant's possessory rights. ' The landlord breaches the
obligation by actual or constructive eviction. Typically, the defense of
constructive eviction excuses failure to pay rent when the landlord's acts,
such as failing to provide heat, substantially interfere with the tenant's
possessory rights. 2' As this case so aptly demonstrates, however, breach
of the covenant will support an action for damages as well as a defense
to a suit for rent or an action of eviction.
Prior case law required that the landlord's "constructive eviction" result
in the tenant abandoning the premises.22 This requirement may reflect the
history of the covenant, which first was used to protect the tenant against
ouster by a superior titleholder. 23 Alternatively, the requirement may be
intended to prevent unjust enrichment or to provide clear evidence of
landlord wrongdoing.
In El Paso, however, the court noted that in limited circumstances the
tenant need not move. If the landlord makes representations based on
which the tenant elects to stay, the tenant's failure to move is excused.
Further, if the landlord acts maliciously and in bad faith in attempting to
oust the tenant, he or she need not move because the covenant of quiet
enjoyment ought to preclude such activity whether or not the tenant
moves. In this case, however, the New Mexico Supreme Court, distinguishing an Iowa case,- concluded that El Paso acted as a reasonable
landlord would act in a good faith rental dispute with a tenant. Although
the court declined to find "constructive eviction," the case illustrates a
liberal attitude toward the doctrine because few cases recognize exceptions
to the requirement that the tenant move from the premises.25
19. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court except for the issue of Kysar's attorney's fees.
El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Kysar Ins. Agency, 98 N.M. 86, 645 P.2d 442 (1982).
20. Cribbet, supra note 10, at 203.
21. Id. at 206-207.
22. Id. at 203.
23. See generally Schoshinski, supra note 8, at 94-95.
24. Kuiken v. Garrett, 243 Iowa 785, 51 N.W.2d 149 (1952).
25. See generally Schoshinski, supra note 8, at 99-100.
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The courts also responded innovatively by applying landlord-tenant
principles to other areas. The New Mexico Supreme Court decided that
exculpatory clauses in bailment contracts prepared by the bailor would
be subject to the same rule governing exculpatory clauses in real property
leases. 26 In a license case, the court refused to imply a warranty of
fitness.27
In New Mexico, landlord-tenant case law continues to evolve, but no
clear pattern has emerged. Statutory changes during the Survey period
only added to the rights of those who lease mineral lands from the state."
The written terms of a lease, particularly a commercial lease, provide
the best and most important protection for landlords and tenants. 29
III. CONTRACTS AND FINANCING
The New Mexico Legislature enacted several measures of significance
to real estate financing law this term. These measures were enacted in
response to case developments3 ° during the period covered by the last
Survey as well as federal legislation with respect to "due-on-sale" clauses.3'
The appellate courts handled several cases which involved direct restraints
on alienation and continued to give guidance on the nature of a real estate
contract. 32
A. "Due-on-Sale" Clauses: Yet Another Round of Legislation
In 1979, the New Mexico Legislature enacted a statute making "dueon-sale" clauses unenforceable unless the lender's interest was substantially impaired by the pending transfer." In 1981, State ex rel. Bingaman
26. Omni Aviation Managers v. Buckley, 97 N.M. 477, 641 P.2d 508 (1982).
27. In Clark v. Sideris, 99 N.M. 209, 656 P.2d 872 (1982), the New Mexico Supreme Court
found that the trial court erred in recognizing an implied warranty as part of the license agreement.
The court refered to T.W.I.W., Inc. v. Rhudy, 96 N.M. 354, 630 P.2d 753 (1981), in reaching this
conclusion.
28. 1983 N.M. Laws ch. 3 (codified at N.M. Stat. Ann. § 19-8-19.1 (Cum. Supp. 1983)) enables
lessees to obtain a suspension of their leases on a showing to the Commissioner of Public Lands
that the land contains valuable mineral deposits which, after notice and hearing, the Commissioner
is satisfied cannot be mined except at a loss or with risk of injury.
29. Statutory law supplements the written or oral lease of residential property. See N.M. Stat.
Ann. §§ 47-8-1 to -51 (Repl. Pamp. 1982). Statutes generally govern the lease of public lands. See,
e.g., N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 19-7-1 to -69 (1978 & Cum. Supp. 1983).
30. See, e.g., Lynch v. Santa Fe Nat'l Bank, 97 N.M. 554, 627 P.2d 1247 (1981), which sustained
language in an escrow agreement that excused the agent from negligent as well as intentional acts.
Among other grounds, the court cited the fact that New Mexico did not regulate escrow companies.
This term the Legislature moved to fill the gap with an "Escrow Company Act." 1983 N.M. Laws
ch. 135 (codified at N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 58-22-1 to -33 (Repl. Pamp. 1983)).
31. See discussion infra at notes 33-53 and accompanying text.
32. See discussion infra at notes 54-62 and accompanying text.
33. 1979 N.M. Laws ch. 45 §§ 1-4, as amended (codified at N.M. Stat. Ann. §§48-7-11 to
-14 (Cum. Supp. 1982)), repealedby 1983 N.M. Laws ch. 314 § 11. The statutes applied to mortgages
or deeds of trust securing an interest in residential property of no more than four units.
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v. Valley Sav. & Loan" sustained the legislation as applied to pre-existing
mortgages. The United States Supreme Court in 1982 ruled that federal
law permitting federal savings and loan associations to enforce "due-onsale" clauses preempted state law restricting enforcement. 35 Late in 1982,
Congress enacted legislation which, with one exception, preempts such
state law entirely. The new legislation, part of the Gan-St. Germain
Depository Institutions Act of 1982,36 became effective October 15, 1982.
Generally, the new legislation "permits all lenders, including noninstitutional private lenders, to enter into and enforce "due-on-sale" clauses
in real property loans, not withstanding any state constitutional provisions,
laws or judicial decisions to the contrary."37 Loans, other than those made
by federally chartered savings and loan associations, made or assumed
between the time a jurisdiction prohibited the exercise of "due-on-sale"
clauses and the date of the new federal legislation, however, received
special treatment.38 For New Mexico, the relevant period of time, described by Congress as the "window period," is March 15, 1979 to
October 15, 1982; the period runs from the date the New Mexico Legislature prohibited the exercise of the "due-on-sale" clauses to the date
the new federal legislation became effective. Loans made during the
"window period," other than those made by federally chartered savings
and loan associations, are not subject to the new federal legislation until
October 15, 1985. Congress, however, invited state legislatures, the
Comptroller of the Currency, and the National Credit Union Administration Board, within their respective jurisdictions, to regulate "window
period" loans during the period from October 15, 1982 to October 15,
1985.
New Mexico accepted the Congressional invitation and enacted legislation to cover "window period" loans.3 9 Under the new state legislation,
a lender may demand an increase in the interest rate, within statutory
limits, as a condition of approving a loan assumption. 4 A lender may
34. 97 N.M. 8, 636 P.2d 279 (1981). The New Mexico Supreme Court concluded that "due-onsale" clauses which predated the statute violated the common law rule against restraints on alienation.
35. Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n. v. De La Cuesta, 102 S. Ct. 3014 (1982). As a result of
the case, federally chartered savings and loan associations enjoyed a competitive advantage over
state counterparts, and some state institutions converted to or merged with federal institutions.
36. Pub. L. No. 97-320, § 341, 1982 U.S. Code & Ad. News (96 Stat.) 1469, 1505. S. Rep.
No. 536, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S. Code & Ad. News 3054, 3074-3079,
contains a very helpful discussion of § 341.
37. Nellis & Schiff, Sweeping Due-on-Sale Preemption Law Enacted by Congress, 11 Prob. &
Prop., Fall 1982, 1,38. The discussion in the text benefitted greatly from this article's organization
and clarity.
38. See Pub. L. No. 97-320, §341 (c), 1982 U.S. Code & Ad. News (96 Stat.) 1469, 15051506.
39. 1983 N.M. Laws ch. 314 (codified at N.M. Stat. Ann. §§48-7-1 to -24 (Cum. Supp. 1983)).
40. N.M. Stat. Ann. §48-7-19 (Cum. Supp. 1983).
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not accelerate the indebtedness and declare a "window period" loan due
and payable. 41 The New Mexico legislation purports to extend the period
of time within which "window period" loans are protected against the
full enforceability of "due-on-sale" clauses beyond October 15, 1985.42
"It is unclear whether the [federal] act permits the comptroller, the NCUAB
and the state legislatures to lengthen the time that due-on-sale restrictions
apply to window period loans." 4 3
The New Mexico legislation also purports to apply to all individuals44
and lending institutions other than federal savings and loan associations.
The federal act clearly states that the Comptroller of the Currency has
the power to regulate "window period" loans made or assumed by national
banks and the National Credit Union Administration Board has the power
45
to regulate "window period" loans made by federal credit unions. Whether
the federal act permits New Mexico to exercise the broad jurisdiction
attempted by the new state legislation is not clear.
With respect to "non-window period" loans, the loan contract will
govern the lender's right to enforce a "due-on-sale" clause, with one
exception.' Federal legislation prohibits a lender from enforcing such a
clause with respect to certain, specified transfers, which include a transfer
by devise, descent, or operation of law, such as the death of a joint tenant,
47
and the creation of an encumbrance subordinate to the lender's security.
48 which is
The New Mexico legislation contains a similar limitation,
accompanied by an assertion that "any lender" who believes "the security
interest is endangered by the transfer of a real property loan may proceed
by foreclosure. "49 The lender must prove that the security interest would
be substantially impaired. Perhaps this assertion qualifies the list of transfers with respect to which a lender may not exercise a "due-on-sale"
41. Id. at §48-7-19(A).
42. Compare id. at § 48-7-3 (which declares that lenders may enforce contracts containing "dueon-sale" clauses with respect to real property loans, except as provided in Sections 5 and 6) with
§ 48-7-5 (which prohibits acceleration of, but authorizes a limited interest rate increase with respect
to, "window period" loans and contains no time limit on its applicability) and with § 48-7-6 (which
limits all "due-on-sale" clauses so that lenders may not exercise them in certain specified transactions,
such as transfer by devise or descent).
43. Nellis & Schiff, supra note 37, at 40. But see S. Rep. No. 536, supra note 36, at 23.
44. 1983 N.M. Laws ch. 314 §(1) (B) (codified at N.M. Stat. Ann. §48-7-15 (B) (Cum. Supp.
1983)).
45. Pub. L. No. 97-320, § 341 (c)(l)(B), 1982 U.S. Code & Ad. News (96 Stat.) 1469, 1506.
S. Rep. No. 536, supra note 36, at 3077, contains the following: "Window period loans originated
by national banks, and federally chartered credit unions, would be subject to applicable state law
for three years, and after three years due-on-sale clauses in those loans would become enforceable,
unless the Comptroller ... or the . . . Board act within the three year period to otherwise regulate
such loans."
46. Id. at § 341 (b).
47. Id. at § 341 (d).
48. 1983 N.M. Laws ch. 314 §6 (codified at N.M. Stat. Ann. § 48-7-20 (Cum. Supp. 1983)).
49. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 48-7-7 (Cum. Supp. 1983).
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clause."0 If this assertion is a qualification, the federal law may not permit
it."' Alternatively, this section might apply to "window period" loans,
which the state seems to have sufficient power to regulate.5 2 The state
legislation does not grant expressly the right to foreclose if a lender can
show impairment of security. The right of foreclosure, therefore, should
be specified by the contract.5 3
B. Real Estate Contracts and Mortgages: Restraints on Alienation and
Other Issues
Federal preemption overturned the result of State ex rel. Bingaman,
which held "due-on-sale" clauses that permit acceleration of a debt without a showing of substantial impairment to the lender's security interest
were unenforceable restraints on alienation. 4 The status of other direct
restraints on alienation under state law is less clear.
Brummund v. FirstNational Bank" provides some guidance. Plaintiffs
sought declaratory relief with respect to provisions in a mortgage of
commercial personalty and realty. The mortgage required the creditor's
consent for a valid transfer of the debtors' interest. Breach of the provisions by the debtors justified default. The plaintiffs argued that the
provisions violated the common law rule against direct restraints on alienation. The court rejected the argument with little discussion. The court
concluded that the Uniform Commercial Code has covered the area and
modified the common law rule.56 Therefore, the case recognizes a statutory limitation on common law rules with respect to direct restraints.
In Hueschen v. Stalie,57 the New Mexico Supreme Court sustained a
vendee's right to lease and give an option to purchase despite a "dueon-sale" clause and a provision that prohibited sale or assignment without
consent. The result suggests that vendees may avoid consent requirements
imposed by the standard real estate contract by arranging a "lease,"
because the court construed the word "assignment" to exclude a lease.
The court required only that the vendee retain a reversionary interest, a
generally broad concept that the opinion does not restrict.5 8 Perhaps,
50. Id. at §48-7-20.
51. Nellis & Schiff, supra note 37, at 40.
52. See S. Rep. No. 536, supra note 36, at 23. The 1979 legislation allowed a lender to enforce
a "due-on-sale" clause if the pending transfer substantially impaired his or her interest. 1979 N.M.
Laws ch. 45 §3 (codified at N.M. Stat. Ann. §48-7-13 (Cum. Supp. 1982)), repealed by 1983
N.M. Laws ch. 314 § 11.
53. See 1983 N.M. Laws ch. 314 § 4 (codified at N.M. Stat. Ann. § 48-7-18 (Cum. Supp. 1983)).
54. 97 N.M. 8, 636 P.2d 279 (1981).
55. 99 N.M. 221, 656 P.2d 884 (1983).
56. N.M. Stat.
Ann. §55-9-311 (1978).
57. 98 N.M. 696, 652 P.2d 246 (1982), discussed infra atnote 10.
58. Common law principles recognize several kinds of reversionary interests. Whether the owner
of a fee simple absolute conveys a life estate, fee simple determinable, or fee simple on condition
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however, the case simply represents strict construction of a direct restraint
on alienation.59
Other cases illustrated, by virtue of the doctrine of equitable conversion, that the vendor has an equitable interest in personal property and
the vendee has an equitable interest in real property." The doctrine of
equitable conversion also proved useful in Hertzmark-Parnegg Realty,
Inc. v. Hunt.6 1 In this case, a real estate broker sued to recover a real
estate commission. The defendant impleaded both the purchaser with
whom he contracted and the limited partnership with whom the purchaser
subsequently contracted and to whom the title company issued the deed.
The limited partnership was a "prospective buyer" to whom the plaintiff,
pursuant to its brokerage contract, had introduced the defendant. The trial
court dismissed the complaint, and the New Mexico Supreme Court
affirmed.
The listing agreement obligated the defendant to pay a commission if
the property was sold, exchanged, or conveyed within twelve months
after the broker introduced the seller. The defendant sold to someone
whom the broker had not introduced, but the purchaser assigned his
interest, prior to the closing with defendant, to the limited partnership
located by the real estate broker. The title company issued a deed from
the defendant directly to the limited partnership.
The New Mexico Supreme Court sustained the trial court's decision
that the relevant "sale" occurred when the defendant contracted to sell
to his purchaser. The court reasoned that once the defendant bound himself
by contract to sell, his vendee became the "owner" under the doctrine
of equitable conversion. Therefore, the "sale" was not made to a "prospective buyer," and the defendant did not owe a commission. The case
seems a sensible use of common law principles to supplement a written
contract.
subsequent, he or she retains what might be termed a reversionary interest, even though more precise
terms exist for the respective interests retained. Further, modem cases and treatises often describe
a landlord's interest in the property leased as a "reversion." Finally, a lessee can convey all of his
or her interest by "assignment" or less than all by "sublease." Historically, assignments differed
from subleases in that the latter transaction left the original lessee with a reversion. The opinions
of the New Mexico Supreme Court and the court of appeals in the same case deal with different
kinds of reversionary interests. As a result, vendee freedom of alienation under a standard real estate
contract remains somewhat unclear.
59. Cf. Cowan v. Chalamidas, 98 N.M. 14, 644 P.2d 528 (1982). The court found that the
landlord acted unreasonably in withholding his consent to an assignment by the tenant. The lease
agreement provided that the landlord would exercise his right to consent reasonably.
60. See, e.g., Romero v. State, 97 N.M. 569, 642 P.2d 172 (1982), which concerned a contract
with the state land office on which the buyer defaulted. Through error the property was not removed
New
from the tax rolls and was sold for taxes to Romero. In a suit to quiet title, Romero lost. The
Mexico Supreme Court reasoned that the legal title remained with the state under the State Enabling
Act, that state land is not subject to taxation, therefore the tax sale was void.
61. 99 N.M. 184, 656 P.2d 234 (1982).
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Few new principles emerged in these cases. Some of the cases illustrate
the continuing usefulness of common law concepts in supplementing real
estate contracts. Others suggest the need for a statutory form which
incorporates and rationalizes the fights of vendor and vendee as developed
by the cases. The scope of a vendor's right to restrain alienation by the
vendee during the duration of a real estate contract deserves thoughtful
consideration, particularly now that federal law has preempted the residential mortgage. Further, although the vendor's interest includes a right
to regain possession for breach of contract, the cases this term illustrate
that forfeiture for breach remains unpredictable.62
IV. DEEDS AND TITLES
The first part of this section surveys the most significant cases in two
areas: joinder requirements for community property 63 and liens. 64 The
supreme court also entertained several construction cases, an adverse
possession case, and two tax title cases. 65 The Legislature raised the
personal property exemptions' and modified the process of recording
judgments. 67 The Legislature also made technical amendments to the New
Mexico Condominium Act, 68 enacted new provisions for unclaimed property,69 and modified the law governing the sale or lease of municipal
property.70 Finally, the Legislature modified the common law Rule Against
62. Compare Albuquerque Nat'l Bank v. Albuquerque Ranch Estates, Inc., 99 N.M. 95, 654
P.2d 548 (1982) (forfeiture granted for late payments) with Hueschen v. Stalie, 98 N.M. 696, 652
P.2d 246 (1982) (vendor's motion for summary judgment denied on ground vendee had not breached
non-assignment clause as a matter of law) discussed infra at note 10.
63. Discussed infra at notes 72-84 and accompanying text.
64. Discussed infra at notes 85-94 and accompanying text.
65. Jensen v. State Highway Comm'n., 97 N.M. 630, 642 P.2d 1089 (1982) (supreme court
reaffirmed its prior decisions that common sand and gravel without exceptional characteristics are
not "minerals" within the meaning of a general reservation clause); HNG Fossil Fuels Co. v. Roach,
99 N.M. 216, 656 P.2d 879 (1982) (supreme court concluded that the phrase "non-participating
mineral interest" was ambiguous and permitted the use of parol evidence to clarify its meaning);
Devlin v. Bowdin, 97 N.M. 547, 641 P.2d 1094 (Ct. App. 1982) (the court of appeals construed a
title policy as excluding a general duty on the part of the title company to report the state of title
to the mineral estate); Cebolleta Land Grant ex rel. Board of Trustees v. Romero, 98 N.M. 1, 644
P.2d 515 (1982) (adverse possession issues arising within a land grant); Romero v. State, 97 N.M.
569, 642 P.2d 172 (1982) (tax sale and title held void because land not subject to tax) discussed
supra at note 60; Worman v. Echo Ridge Homes Cooperative, 98 N.M. 237, 647 P.2d 870 (1982)
(supreme court declined to find "constructive fraud" sufficient to void a tax title because the state
had "substantially complied" with the statutory notice requirements).
66. 1983 N.M. Laws ch. 69 (amending N.M. Stat. Ann. §§42-10-1 and -2 (Cum. Supp. 1983)).
67. 1983 N.M. Laws ch. 89 and 169 (amending N.M. Stat. Ann. §§39-1-6 to -8 (Cum. Supp.
1983)).
68. 1983 N.M. Laws ch. 245 (codified as amendments to N.M. Stat. Ann. §§47-7A-5, 47-7B17, 47-7B-5, 47-7B-8, 47-7C-16, and 47-7C-17 (Supp. 1983)).
69. 1983 N.M. Laws ch. 50 (codified as N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 29-1-13 to -15 (Cum. Supp. 1983)).
70. 1983 N.M. Laws ch. 115 (codified as N.M. Stat. Ann. §§3-54-1 and an amended §3-54-2
(Cum. Supp. 1983)).
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Perpetuities. The new statute 7 permits parties to "wait-and-see" whether
in fact a violation of the Rule will occur, rather than testing future interests
as of the effective date of the conveyance. Further, the new statute enables
a court of competent jurisdiction to modify the offending interest, reforming it to satisfy the Rule but observing the grantor's intent as much
as possible. The last part of this section surveys this legislation.
A. JoinderRequirements: Management of Community Real Property
Two cases involved issues which required the courts to reconcile statutory provisions. Dotson v. Grice72 considered the applicability of the
Uniform Partnership Act's management provision73 to property held by
three persons, two of whom held as community property with the third
as tenant in common. Only one of the three persons signed a contract to
sell to the plaintiff, who sued all three for specific performance. The trial
court granted specific performance, and the New Mexico Supreme Court
affirmed.
The supreme court observed that transmutation rules were not applicable. The community owns an interest in a partnership rather than an
interest in particular property contributed by the community. Transfers in
which community property is altered to separate property or vice versa
require transmutation analysis, but purchase of an interest in a partnership
does not. 4 The court also observed that the community no longer owned
realty, but rather owned an interest in partnership assets. Therefore, joinder of both spouses was not required for sale. Finally, the court found
that a sufficient pattern of conduct had created a partnership even though
there was no written partnership agreement.
Dotson illustrates an interesting interface between the joint and several
management provisions of the Community Property Act and those of the
Uniform Partnership Act. Spouses who own community personalty must
join in order to encumber or dispose of the property if both spouses are
named in a document evidencing ownership of such property."5 In Dotson,
a deed evidenced title to real property. The joinder rules applicable to
community personalty arguably applied even though the community interest was in the partnership rather than in a specific piece of partnership
realty. The Legislature should amend the Community Property Act provisions to state clearly that both spouses need not join in this situation.
71. 1983 N.M. Laws ch. 246 (codified as N.M. Stat. Ann. § 47-1-17.1 (Cum. Supp. 1983)).
72. 98 N.M. 207, 647 P.2d 409 (1982).
73. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 54-1-10 (D) (1978).
74. Estate of Fletcher v. Jackson, 94 N.M. 572, 613 P.2d 714 (Ct. App. 1980), cert. denied, 94
N.M. 674, 615 P.2d 991 (1980), also limits transmutation analysis by excluding initial classification
problems and apparently defining those problems to include taking title in joint tenancy.
75. N.M. Stat. Ann. §40-3-14 (C) (Repl. Pamp. 1983).
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Although the Dotson result creates an opportunity for sole management,
the exception created by Dotson seems appropriate. The facts suggest
that the court found both parties were estopped to argue the agent's lack
of authority.76
The court also reconciled the Community Property Act joinder requirements for community real property and recording act protection.77 Purchasers who obtain the signature of the record title owner without notice
that he or she holds the realty as community property are protected by
the recording act against the non-joining spouse. In Jeffers v. Doel7 5 the
New Mexico Supreme Court reversed the third summary judgment entered
for the seller in just such a fact pattern. In 1978, the Jeffers entered into
an agreement with Ms. Doel (then Martinez) for the purchase of a house
and lot in Albuquerque. Prior to 1977, the house and lot represented Ms.
Doel's separate property. Ms. Doel claimed that in 1977 she executed a
quit claim deed to herself and her husband, converting her separate interest
to a community interest.
The trial court concluded that whether or not the plaintiffs were bona
fide purchasers for value at the date of the closing, they could not recover
more than the money paid down plus interest. In reversing and remanding,
the supreme court reiterated the necessity for a factual finding with respect
to Jeffers' status as innocent purchasers for value without notice. If the
Jeffers qualify as such purchasers, then the recording act protects them
against the unrecorded community property interest and they are entitled
to specific performance of the promise to sell and convey. The case is
most important, however, for its language with respect to damages. The
supreme court stated that the Jeffers might recover benefit-of-the-bargain
damages for failure to deliver good title or, in the alternative, they could
recover for fraud or misrepresentation.
Prior New Mexico case law has not clearly established the right of a
purchaser to recover benefit-of-the-bargain damages when the seller is
unable to tender marketable title due to a defect not known to the seller
when he or she contracts to sell.79 Many jurisdictions permit such recovery, whether or not the seller is acting in good faith without knowledge
of a defect when he contracted to sell." ° Others follow the English rule
76. I am indebted to Professor Willis H. Ellis for this suggestion.
77. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 14-9-3 (1978).
78. 99 N.M. 351, 658 P.2d 426 (1982).
79. Compare Conley v. Davidson, 35 N.M. 173, 291 P. 489 (1930), in which the defect was of
a type, lack of spousal consent, for which such damages are available on the ground the seller should
have known he or she could not tender marketable title with Aboud v. Adams, 84 N.M. 683, 507
P.2d 430 (1973), in which the seller sued for breach of contract, a situation to which the normal
contract damage remedy, loss of bargain plus consequential damages, ordinarily applies. Cribbet,
supra note 10, at 145-46, discusses the problem briefly. D. Dobbs, Remedies 832-36 (1973), discusses
the particular problem in more depth.
80. See, e.g., Smith v. Warr, 564 P.2d 771 (Utah 1977).
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which limits the purchaser to out-of-pocket expenses under such circumstances. 81 Jeffers provides additional evidence that the New Mexico appellate courts will not recognize the English rule.
Prior New Mexico cases and legislation also appeared to establish that
a contract to sell community property was not only void absent the signature of both spouses,82 but further, that no damages were recoverable
absent special circumstances supporting an action for fraud or misrepre84
sentation." The reference to Conley v. Davidson, in which the court
found the spouse who alone had signed had acted in bad faith, may
suggest that the seller who knowingly commits to sell community property
without both signatures has committed fraud, actual or constructive.
Jeffers and Dotson raise difficult issues. Perhaps case law from other
jurisdictions with comparable management schemes will prove useful in
analyzing similarly difficult issues as they arise.
B. Property Transfers by Court Decree: Liens and Exemptions
The Survey period included a number of cases which discuss the rights
of lienholders.85 USLife Title Insurance Co. v. Romero, 6 illustrates how
a right of subrogation as well as the right to claim a homestead exemption
may disappear. Three brothers had a partnership doing business as Sierra
Electric. In 1975, the Internal Revenue Service recorded a lien against
Sierra and the three brothers for 1973 taxes. In 1976, Albuquerque Federal
Savings and Loan Association took a mortgage on the home of one of
the brothers, Robert Romero, which the title company insured without
excepting the I.R.S. lien. Other creditors subsequently recorded liens
against Sierra and the brothers. In 1978, the I.R.S. gave notice of a
foreclosure sale of Robert Romero's property. Albuquerque Federal required USLife Title to pay the lien under the title insurance policy, and
81. See, e.g., Kramer v. Mobley, 309 Ky. 143, 216 S.W.2d 930 (1949). Flureau v. Thornhill, 2
W. BI. 1078, 96 Eng. Rep. 635 (1776), seems to recognize the so-called "English rule" first. See
Cribbet, supra note 10, at 145-46. See also Dobbs, supra note 79, at 835-36.
82. Sims v. Craig, 96 N.M. 33, 34, 627 P.2d 875, 876 (1981).
83. Hannah v. Tennant, 92 N.M. 444, 589 P.2d 1035 (1979). See also N.M. Stat. Ann. §40-313 (A) (1978), which expressly requires joinder for a contract to convey community real property,
and A. Bingaman, The Community Property Act of 1973: A Commentary and Quasi-Legislative
History, 5 N.M.L. Rev. 1, 32-33 (1974), in which Professor Bingaman, who helped draft the Act
as it was introduced in the Legislature, concluded that the inclusion of "contracts to convey" overruled
prior case law denying specific performance to contracts signed by only one spouse but permitting
damages for breach of contract.
84. 35 N.M. 173, 291 P.489 (1930).
85. The issues which these cases discuss exemplify the overlap between and among the topical
divisions this section of the Survey adopts. Placing the foreclosure of liens within "DEEDS AND
TITLES" rather than "ACTIONS AND PROCEEDINGS" may highlight the significance of creditors'
rights in evaluating titles, and for that reason the placement seems more desirable than the alternatives.
"Property," after all, is a "bundle of rights," in which liens and exemptions belong.
86. 98 N.M. 699, 652 P.2d 249 (Ct. App. 1982).
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after paying the lien, the title company recorded a claim of subrogation
to the rights of the I.R.S. as lienholder.
USLife Title filed suit in 1978 to foreclose on Robert Romero's house,
joining the three brothers, two wives, and various creditors. In none of
their answers did the three brothers and two wives claim a homestead
exemption. The final judgment and decree of foreclosure did not recognize
the title company's claim to subrogation, but it permitted the homeowners
to claim the homestead exemption.
The court of appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part. With respect
to USLife Title's claim to subrogation, the court observed that the title
company was aware of the tax lien when it issued the insurance policy
and negligently concluded that the tax lien was recorded against a different
Robert Romero. The court concluded that negligence precluded USLife
Title from exercising its right of subrogation.
The Romeros' right to a homestead exemption was denied on the basis
of prior law.8 7 Under the old statutory scheme, a general foreclosure
statute 88 specifically required that the party claim his or her exemption
by answer in the foreclosure suit. Although the court did not discuss the
homestead exemption statute, its language suggests that a party must
make such a claim. 9 The general foreclosure statute to which the court
makes reference continues in force, but the language of the new homestead
exemption seems significantly different.'
The older homestead exemption statute also applied in Ranchers State
Bank v. Vega.91 In this case, the question was whether the former $10,000
exemption was available, or whether the debtor could take advantage of
the new, $20,000 exemption. Ranchers State Bank sued to foreclose a
mortgage and the federal government intervened to foreclose a judgment
lien. The trial court granted foreclosure subject to a homestead exemption
of $10,000. The debtor appealed.
The New Mexico Supreme Court affirmed. The amended exemption
statute became effective June 15, 1979. Prior to that date, the federal
87. 1979 N.M. Laws ch. 9 § 1 and ch. 182 §3 (codified at N.M. Stat. Ann. §42-10-9 (Cum.
Supp. 1983)).
88. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 39-4-15 (1978).
89. Prior to amendment in 1983, the homestead exemption statute provided that a married person,
widow, widower, or person supporting another person "may hold exempt" a homestead, provided
the person "claiming the exemption" owned, leased, or was purchasing the property. See N.M. Stat.
Ann. § 42-10-9 (1978) (codified as amended Id. Cum. Supp. 1983). The statute further provided
that such a person "may claim a homestead of ten thousand dollars ... exempt from attachment .... "Id.
90. See N.M. Stat. Ann. § 42-10-9 (Cum. Supp. 1983), which provides that a married person
"shall have exempt" a homestead, provided the person "claiming the exemption" owned
the property.
Further, the amended statute provides that a person "has a homestead of twenty thousand dollars
...exempt from attachment. .... "
91. 99 N.M. 42, 653 P.2d 873 (1982).
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government obtained a judgment against the debtor and obtained a lien
by recording a transcript of the judgment. On February 17, 1981, the
district court foreclosed the lien with Ranchers' mortgage. The laws in
force when the contract arose remained in force when the lien attached.
Therefore, the court had no need to reach the constitutional issue of the
new exemption's retroactivity.
In Northern Pueblos Enterprises v. Montgomery,9 2 the supreme court
held that a trial court has the power to award an attorney less than he or
she asks in the context of a proceeding to enforce an attorney's lien
because the decision does not adjudicate the size of the fee due as between
the attorney and his client. No statutes govern the attorney's lien.
These cases illustrate significant issues arising under older statutory
schemes. These statutes need review by practitioners who use them most
frequently. The courts are reaching sensible results where the statutes are
silent or ambiguous, but statutory revision might have resolved some of
the issues without the time and expense of litigation. Further, a variety
of liens appear throughout the statutes and cases with respect to which
wording and procedure sometimes are unclear.9 3 Clarification of the lien
law seems desirable.'
C. Limits on the Grantor'sFreedom of Alienation: The Reform of the
Rule Against Perpetuities
Generally there are few restrictions on a property owner's power of
sale and gift. An owner may convey all that he or she possesses or
something less. As evidenced by several cases discussed in this Survey,
an owner may condition the transfer in a number of innovative ways."
The common law apparently forbad the owner to impose direct restraints on alienation, except in limited circumstances.96 The "due-on92. 98 N.M. 47, 644 P.2d 1036 (1982). The other case to consider attorneys' liens was Robinson
v. Campbell, 99 N.M. 579, 661 P.2d 479 (Ct. App. 1983). Robinson, which resolved a number of
other issues, followed Northern Pueblos Enterprises in recognizing trial court discretion to award
less than the full amount of the lien claimed.
93. Compare Speartex Grain Co. v. West, 98 N.M. 91, 645 P.2d 447 (Ct. App. 1982), (construing
the lien provided under N.M. Stat. Ann. §§42-4-14 to -19 (1978)) discussed supra at notes 11-16
and accompanying text with Northern Pueblos Enterprises v. Montgomery, 98 N.M. 47, 644 P.2d
1036 (1982), (construing the attorneys' lien, a product of case law) discussed supra at note 92 and
accompanying text.
94. "ACTIONS AND PROCEEDINGS," infra at notes 121-27 and accompanying text, includes
a related discussion.
95. Compare Hueschen v. Stalie, 98 N.M. 696, 652 P.2d 246 (1982) (vendee under a real estate
contract leased his interest and gave an option to purchase) with HNG Fossil Fuels Co. v. Roach,
99 N.M. 216, 656 P.2d 879 (1982) (owner of mineral-bearing land conveyed a "non-participating
mineral interest").
96. See L. Simes, Future Interests §§ 112-119 (2d ed. 1966).
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sale" clause in the near future will be an exception by reason of federal
law.97 New Mexico cases also have recognized several exceptions.9 8
English common law judges apparently paid little attention to indirect
restraints on alienation,99 allowing the property owner relatively wide
latitude in creating conditions that as a practical matter inhibited the
grantee's power of alienation. The major barrier to grantor creativity in
conveyancing was the common law Rule Against Perpetuities, which
voided certain future interests unless they were certain to become possessory or otherwise satisfy a highly technical "vesting" requirement
within a fixed period of time."o
Unless the interest clearly would become possessory or "vest" within
the allotted time, it was void ab initio. Under the cases, ordinarily only
that interest was eliminated, and the balance of the conveyance took effect
as written. Often this resulted in an unforeseen reversionary interest in
the grantor. It was also possible, through a principle termed "infectious
invalidity," for more of the grant to fail if a court of competent jurisdiction
were persuaded such a result best advanced the clear intent of the grantor. 0 '
The common law Rule affects transfers of land and transfers of personal
property. It applies to transfers of legal title, transfers in trust, and to
commercial as well as donative transactions. 02
'
Scholars have taken exception to the Rule's technicality. Some authors
have criticized the fact that applying the Rule sometimes requires fine
distinctions among future interests not otherwise of modem significance. 103 Moreover, possibilities of reverter and rights of re-entry are
97. See discussion supra at notes 33-53 and accompanying text.
98. Compare Hueschen v. Stalie, 98 N.M. 696, 652 P.2d 246 (1982), (court assumes validity of
"due-on-sale clause" and provision prohibiting sale or assignment without consent within real estate
contract, but construes vendee's act as outside consent requirement) and Cowan v. Chalamidas, 98
N.M. 14, 644 P.2d 528 (1982), (court recognized a landlord's right to require consent prior to
transfer by lessee, but applied principles of good faith and commercial reasonableness to the consent
requirement) with Brummund v. First Nat'l Bank, 99 N.M. 221, 656 P.2d 884 (1983) (the court
sustained a creditor's right to require consent for a valid transfer of the debtor's interest in a mortgage
of commercial personalty and realty).
99. See L. Simes & A. Smith, The Law of Future Interests § 1201 (2d ed. 1956).
100. Id. § 1202. "The classic statement of the Rule . .. reads: No interest [in real or personal
property] is good unless it must vest, if at all, not later than twenty-one years after some life in
being at the creation of the interest." J. Dukeminier & S. Johansen, Family Wealth Transactions:
Wills, Trusts, and Estates (2d ed. 1978). This casebook contains an excellent introduction to the
Rule at pages 970-1005. The casebook also handles class gifts (pages 1006-21), powers of appointment (pages 1031-48), and reform movements (pages 1051-70) concisely, clearly and, above all,
with a sense of humor.
101. See, e.g., In re Estate of Morton, 454 Pa. 385, 312 A.2d 26 (1973).
102. See, e.g., Prime v. Hyne, 260 Cal. App. 2d 397, 67 Cal. Rptr. 170 (1968).
103. For example, the Rule Against Perpetuities distinguishes contingent remainders and executory
interests by applying different tests for vesting under some circumstances. See Dukeminier & Johansen, supra note 100, at 983-84. Professor Dukeminier has argued that no relevant difference
distinguishes the two interests in jurisdictions that have abolished the common law doctrine of
destructibility and the Rule in Shelley's Case. See Dukeminier, ContingentRemainders and Executory
Interests:A Requiem for the Distinction, 43 Minn. L. Rev. 13 (1958). For an article criticizing this
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exempt from the Rule, although in function they cause problems which
4
are comparable to those caused by executory interests. Additonally,
critics have ridiculed the Rule because courts must take into account
highly improbable and often ridiculously unlikely possibilities in determining whether10 5a future interest will become possessory or otherwise
"vest" in time. Despite criticism, relatively few states have reformed
the common law Rule. The reforms that have occurred follow four basic
patterns. The first directs that in applying the Rule, actual events rather
than possible events are important."o This approach has the weakness of
leaving unclear how long one must "wait-and-see." In more recent sta07
tutory versions of this pattern, the phrase is defined or clarified."
Another pattern authorizes courts to modify conveyances that otherwise
would involve a violation of the Rule .' 08 States following this route, either
by statute or case law, seem to have borrowed the analogy of a court's
equitable power to modify a charitable trust which has failed, pursuant
to the doctrine of cy pres.
States have enacted statutes which both permit a court to "wait-andsee" and grant the court a power of cy pres." New Mexico joined the
ranks of these states when the Legislature enacted H.B. 418.11° This
reform, which is comparable in policy to that proposed by the American
Law Institute,"' consists of a deceptively short, one-paragraph provision. 1 2
aspect of the rule for vesting, see Schuyler, Should The Rule Against PerpetuitiesDiscard Its Vest?,
56 Mich. L. Rev. 887 (1958).
104. See, e.g., Leach, Perpetuitiesin Perspective: Ending the Rule's Reign of Terror, 65 Harv.
L. Rev. 721, 739-45 (1952).
105. Professor Leach's classic article, Perpetuities in a Nutshell, 51 Harv. L. Rev. 638 (1938),
gave enduring names to such diverse characters as the "fertile octogenarian" and the "unborn
widow."
106. See, e.g., Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Curtis, 98 N.H. 225, 97 A.2d 207 (1953); Mass. Gen.
Laws Ann. ch. 184A § 1 (West 1977).
107. See, e.g., Ky. Rev. Stat. § 381.216 (1979). The Kentucky statute limits the period to "lives
whose continuance" has "a causal relationship to the vesting or failure of the interest." Id. Kentucky,
however, is a state which has reformed the Rule Against Perpetuities by both permitting "wait-andsee" and granting the cy pres power. Id.
108. See, e.g., In re Estate of Chun Quan Yee Hop, 52 Hawaii 40, 469 P.2d 183 (1970); Tex.
Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 1291 (b) (Vernon 1980).
109. See, e.g., Ky. Rev. Stat. § 381.216 (1979). At least one state reached this result by case
law. See Carter v. Berry, 243 Miss. 321, 140 So. 2d 843 (1962) (doctrine of cy pres adopted) and
Phelps v. Shropshire, 254 Miss. 777, 183 So. 2d 158 (1966) ("wait-and-see" adopted).
110. 1983 N.M. Laws ch. 246 (codified at N.M. Stat. Ann. 47-1-17.1 (Cum. Supp. 1983)).
111. See Restatement (Second) of Property §§ 1.3-1.5 (1983). Section 1.4 sets out a "wait-andsee" doctrine, approved in 1979 for incorporation into the second Restatement after a vigorous
debate. Section 1.3 specifies a number of "measuring lives," some of which "may have no relationship to vesting apart from governing the perpetuities period." See J. Dukeminier & J. Krier,
Property 478 n.59 (1981). Section 1.5 describes the doctrine of cy pres.
112. The paragraph states:
In determining whether an interest would violate the rule against perpetuities,
the period of perpetuities shall be measured by actual rather than possible events;
provided, however, the period shall not be measured by any lives whose con-
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A fourth kind of reform treats particular problems. For example, several
states have statutes which limit the time period within which possibilities
of reverter and rights of re-entry, exempt from the Rule, may have effect.1 3 Others specifically eliminate such archane possibilities as the "fertile octogenarian" and the "unborn widow. "11 4 Still others exempt pension
and profit-sharing trusts from the Rule's operation. 15
I
Prior to 1983, New Mexico had enacted two, quite limited reforms.116
With H.B. 418, however, the common law Rule in New Mexico has
undergone a metamorphosis. For New Mexico lawyers, the change first
represents an opportunity to salvage gifts or other arrangements that may
violate the Rule. To that extent, the reform should work to advance the
testator's intent rather than defeat it. The reform also provides an opportunity to obtain a judicial determination of a result that departs from
the terms of the instrument. On the other hand, the change probably
means greater title uncertainty. For some instruments, considerable time
must pass before the interests created under the instrument will prove
valid or fail." 7 For many transfers, however, title uncertainty is not a
real problem. Most transfers which create future interests occur as part
of a trust. In a well-written instrument, trustee powers enable the trustee
to deal with the trust property as fully as if he, she, or it owned the
property outright in fee. Under New Mexico's Probate Code, statutory
powers equip the trustee whose instrument is silent with respect to powers. "8
Therefore, for many situations in which the new statute potentially plays
a role, the legal title is clear and the trustee who holds legal title will not
be affected by the lack of clear beneficial or equitable title.
The Rule most harshly affects transactions in which careless drafting
creates a contingent future interest with a remote and technical capacity
tinuance does not have a causal relationship to the vesting or failure of the
interest. Any interest which would violate said rule as thus modified shall be
reformed, within the limits of that rule, to approximate most closely the intention
of the creator of the interest. 1983 N.M. Laws ch. 246 (codified at N.M. Stat.
Ann. §47-1-17.1 (Cum. Supp. 1983)).
(Note that New Mexico's statute, unlike Restatement (Second) of Property § 1.3, does not set forth
specific measuring lives.) A helpful collection of cases and law review commentary appears in 6
American Law of Property §§24.11 & 24.11 (A) (A. J. Casner ed. 1952 Supp. 1977). Section
24.11 deals with legislative change; § 24.11 (A) deals with judicial change.
113. See, e.g., Ky. Rev. Stat. §381.219 (1979).
114. See, e.g., N.Y. Estates, Powers & Trusts Law § 9-1.3 (b) (McKinney 1967) and (e) (McKinney
1967 & Supp. 1983-84).
115. See 5 R. Powell, The Law of Real Property 1774 (1981).
116. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 47-1-3 (1978), exempting trusts for the benefit of employees, and N.M.
Stat. Ann. § 47-7B-3 (B) (Cum. Supp. 1983), exempting provisions of a declaration, the by-laws,
and the rules and regulations adopted pursuant to the Condominium Act.
117. The New Mexico statute, however, appears to limit the period during which interested parties
must wait to that measured by lives causally related to "vesting" plus 21 years. The Restatement,
in contrast, selects measuring lives differently and "lengthens substantially in some instances the
period during which" the property title remains in doubt. Dukeminier & Krier, supra note I11.
118. See N.M. Stat. Ann. §45-7-401 (1978).

Winter 1984]

PROPERTY LAW

to violate its requirements. In such a case, neither the future character
of the interest nor the remote possibility was foreseen by the draftsper20
son." 9 H.B. 418 should provide a better result than did the Rule.
V. ACTIONS AND PROCEEDINGS

Several cases during the Survey period discussed the elements of the
remedial relief sought. Three cases 2 ' involved the tort of conversion and
straightforwardly illustrated the scope of that tort. The most significant
cases emphasized judicial discretion within the statutory proceeding of
22
partition. There were no major legislative developments in this area.'
3
In Pino v. Sanchez, ' the supreme court recognized the trial court's
discretion to order intra-party cash adjustments for unequal land divisions,
but set out guidelines within which those adjustments can be made. In
Pino, the parties had stipulated to descriptions of the real estate and to
the parties' respective interests. The trial court accordingly adjudicated
rights to one of three tracts. The commissioners who were appointed to
recommend a plan of partition for the other two tracts recommended that
Tract 3 be set over to one of the parties, and that Tract 2 be sold in order
to reimburse the other parties for their respective shares in Tract 3. The
trial court found that awarding Tract 3 to one party resulted in that party
receiving an excess distribution of over $77,000. The court ordered that
this excess be reimbursed to the other parties when Tract 3 was sold, but
set no specific time within which the sale must occur.
On appeal, the plaintiffs argued that the trial court erred in failing to
order either immediate compensation to them for the excess distribution
119. Cf. Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal.2d 583, 364 P.2d 685, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821 (1961). In Lucas, the
draftsman established a residuary trust which terminated five years after distribution of the residuary
estate to the trustee by the probate court. Although the court stated it was not necessary to decide
whether the Rule made the provision invalid, the draftsman could have avoided the issue relatively
easily. He could have provided, for example, that the trust would terminate in no event later than
21 years after the death of the testator.
120. In a Lucas fact pattern, actual events rather than possible events control. The possibility of
delayed distribution by the probate court should be ignored, and the parties need wait no longer
than a specific number of years after the testator's death because the trust terminated upon an event
not related to any person's lifetime. If the probate court orders distribution within 16 years, the will
should take effect as written because the beneficial interests will become possessory five years later.
In the unlikely event that distribution is delayed beyond 16 years, then the court must reform the
will as closely as possible to effectuate the testator's intent. The court might decide to reduce the
time the trust continues after distribution, or if necessary eliminate the trust, on the ground that the
time during which the personal representative administered the estate provided a sufficient period
of fiduciary management. The new statute seems to produce a result that is better than the Lucas
result, because the testator's intent probably will take effect exactly as expressed.
121. Apodaca v. Unknown Heirs of Owners and Proprietors of Tome Land Grant, 98 N.M. 620,
651 P.2d 1264 (1982); Miller v. Bourdage, 98 N.M. 801, 653 P.2d 177 (Ct. App. 1982); Newman
v. Basin Motor Co. 98 N.M. 39, 644 P.2d 553 (Ct. App. 1982).
122. The Legislature, however, amended the statute providing damages for inverse condemnation.
See 1983 N.M. Laws ch. 131 (amending N.M. Stat. Ann. §42A-1-29 (1978)).
123. 98 N.M. 150, 646 P.2d 577 (1982).
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to one defendant or interest payments pending sale and an order to sell
by a definite time. The supreme court agreed with the plaintiffs and
reversed, although it recognized that a trial court judge enjoys broad
discretion to apply equitable principles.
The court discussed the equitable character of partition and specifically
approved the trial court's use of "owelty." This principle, first recognized
in New Mexico in 1914, is "an appropriate mechanism to be used by a
court of equity, to equalize shares in partition of property where the
property is incapable of exact or fair division. "124 The award of "owelty"
carries with it a duty to respond equitably. The equitable maxim, "He
who seeks equity must do equity," applied in this fact pattern. In deciding,
as a matter of first impression in New Mexico, whether and how the
maxim applied, the court identified the underlying relevant principle as
one of preventing unjust enrichment. The court ordered that the recipient
either be required to pay the excess immediately, or that she be required
to pay interest until such time as Tract 3 is sold, and that a definite time
for sale be set. In making its decision, the court cited a case from the
turn of the century, in which the Rhode Island Supreme Court outlined
the conditions governing owelty. 25
' The supreme court found that the facts
before it satisfied this test.
In Martinez v. Martinez,126 the supreme court also considered the trial
court's discretion in partition proceedings, and decided that the trial court
judge had exceeded his authority allowing partition to terminate a father's
support liability. Although partition is a right available to co-tenants by
statute, a trial court has the authority to deny it "where the partition
would be against public policy, legal principles, equitable principles, or
is waived by an agreement of the parties. "127 In this case, the trial court
should have denied partition until the children became adult or emancipated. Alternatively, the trial court should have ordered the property sold
and the proceeds divided. Public policy required that the father continue
to be liable for support while public assistance payments continue.
These cases illustrate the lack of clarity in older statutory schemes,
such as that controlling partition. A contemporary restatement of the
statutes governing real property actions would be useful.
VI. CONCLUSION
New Mexico court decisions enriched each of the four areas discussed.
Although the 1983 Legislature helped the courts clarify the law governing
124. Id. at 151, 646 P.2d at 578 (1982). The court cites Field v. Hudson, 19 N.M. 89, 140 P.
1118 (1914).
125. Updike v. Adams, 24 R.I. 220, 52 A. 991 (1902).
126. 98 N.M. 535, 650 P.2d 819 (1982).
127. Id. at 540, 650 P.2d at 824.
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restraints on alienation, real estate contracts continue to require much
judicial construction. In addition, the contemporary importance of older
statutory schemes justifies review and revision of several statutes. A
comprehensive review of real property substantive law and procedure
seems in order.128

F128 128. See generally "Real Estate Contracts and Mortgages: Restraints on Alienation and
Other Issues," supra at notes 54-62 and accompanying text, "Property Transfers by Court Decree:
Liens and Exemptions," supra at notes 85-94 and accompanying text, and "ACTIONS AND PROCEEDINGS," supra at notes 121-27 and accompanying text.

